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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below, 
Plaintiffs, beneficiaries of a trust, filed this action seeking to void certain transfers 
made by the Trustee of the trust, Bruce Hughes, to companies in which Bruce Hughes 
and the now deceased Trustor held pecuniary interests. Plaintiffs asserted that because 
the Trustee had an interest in those business entities that the transactions should be 
voided. 
On June 30, 2006, Defendants filed their second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
R. 264. Plaintiffs opposed the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and filed 
their own Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 283.) However, Plaintiffs did not 
dispute the Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts that dealt specifically with 
calculation of the debt owed by the decedent's estate to the various business entities. Id. 
Nonetheless, upon hearing on December 12, 2006, the Court issued its Order on Motions 
for Summary Judgment, wherein it denied Defendants' Second Motion for Judgment and 
granted, in part, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment indicating that the Trustee had 
breached fiduciary duty by making payment to the related business entities and ordering 
that the funds be disgorged to the trust. (R. 344.) Eventually, those funds were disgorged 
and held in trust by Plaintiffs' counsel, pursuant to court order. 
Shortly after issuance of the Court's Order on Summary Judgment, Defendants 
filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings of Fact and/or Judgment. (R. 353.) At that 
time, Defendants believed that the Court entered an erroneous Finding of Fact. (R. 354.) 
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Specifically, the Court found that the business entities had not conducted specific 
valuations under certain buy-sell agreement that required appraisals by an independent 
certified public accountant. (R. 348.) The Court's other Findings of Fact specifically 
quoted the buy-sell agreement wherein the valuation of an independent certified public 
accountant was required if the shareholders or members of the entities had not 
unanimously agreed to an adjustment of the buy-sell agreement price for two consecutive 
fiscal years. (R. 347.) It was clear that the deceased Trustor of the trust died within two 
years of the agreement and, therefore, valuation of the price at that time did not require an 
independent certified public accountant. (R. 356-357.) 
The Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Findings went to hearing on February 
20, 2007. Although the Court appears to recognize this error in Findings of Fact, the 
Court continues to struggle with issuing a ruling until a proper calculation may be made. 
Therefore, the Court's ruling on that date recognized that Defendants had already set 
forth evidence of what the proper calculation of the debt was to the business entities. The 
Court specifically states, "We decided that the next step is to find out what is the price." 
(R. 642 lines 9-10, A copy of the Courts Transcript is provided for convenience in the 
Addendum to this Brief.) The Court continued stating, "It may be moot if you're right 
and an expert suggested by the Plaintiffs comes in and looks at what your clients did and 
said, yeah, that's the way you value it, they were right, then we're done." (R. 643 lines 7-
11.) The parties went on to discuss with the Court an extension of discovery deadlines to 
allow Plaintiffs time to provide an expert to refute Defendants' presented evidence of the 
proper calculation. The Court stated, "The discovery deadlines have to be extended so 
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you can get out and get some expert testimony on this." (R. 644 lines 5-7.) The Court 
further addressed to Defendants that, "You may want to get your own independent expert 
who's going to say exactly what your people said." (R. Id. lines 9-11.) The Court notes 
that, "Mr. Kuhlmann might find that he can't find one [an expert], in which case this case 
is over with." (R. Id. lines 13-15.) Thereafter, the parties entered into a Stipulated 
Scheduling Order, which was entered on April 26, 2007, wherein each of the parties had 
a date certain to identify a designated expert and provide a report. (R. 391.) Pursuant to 
the Order, Plaintiffs were required to first identify an expert then Defendants could 
identify an expert. Id. Thereafter, the Order required that Plaintiffs first provide an expert 
report then Defendants provide an expert report. Id. 
Plaintiffs identified an expert but failed to provide any expert report. Defendants 
thqn filed their third Motion for Summary Judgment when Plaintiffs failed to provide any 
expert report. (R. 431.) Defendants again asserted, as a basis for summary judgment, that 
they had produced undisputed fact as to the proper calculation and that the Plaintiffs had 
failed to come forward with any evidence, expert or otherwise, to refute that calculation, 
and could not, refute said calculation at trial. (R. 436.) The trial court heard argument on 
the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment on January 8, 2008, and entered its 
memorandum decision on Motions for Summary Judgment on February 4, 2008. (R. 
593.) The Court recognized that the Plaintiffs had failed to procure an expert or do any 
review of the Defendants' otherwise undisputed calculation of the debt owed to the 
business entities. (R. 594.) Because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to that 
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calculation, the Court ruled in Defendants' favor and ordered a return of the previously 
disgorged funds. (R. 595.) 
II. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
The best statement of relevant facts from which to understand this case comes 
from the Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts in its second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. It is important to note that Plaintiffs, in its Memorandum in Opposition, 
disputed none of these facts, except Paragraph number 6 for the legal status of Academy 
Equity Investors, LLC, in that the company had expired for failure to renew in 2005. (R. 
283.) Otherwise, all of the foregoing facts, including the calculation of the debt owed by 
the decedent Trustor to the business entities, were undisputed. 
1. Plaintiffs are the adult children of decedent Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr and 
beneficiaries of the Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr Living Trust dated December 5, 2000. (R. 
279.) 
2. Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr died on October 18, 2001. (R. 279.) 
3. Bruce Hughes was named as the successor trustee of the Sheryl Marie Bluth 
Farr Living Trust and acted as such upon the death of Sheryl Marie Bluth Fair. (R. 279.) 
4. Defendant The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc. is a Utah Corporation doing 
business in Iron County, Utah. (R. 279.) 
5. Prior to the death of Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr the shareholders of The Academy 
At Cedar Mountain owning an equal number shares, were Sheryl Marie Blulh Farr, Bruce 
Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Turtle. (R. 279.) 
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6. Defendant Academy Equity Investors, LLC, is a Utah Limited Liability 
Company. (R. 279.) 
7. Prior to the death of Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr the members of Academy Equity 
Investors, LLC, holding equal interests, were Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr. Bruce Hughes, 
Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Tuttle. (R. 279.) 
8. Academy Acres, LLC, is a Utah Limited Liability Company. (R. 279.) 
9. Prior to the death of Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr the members of Academy Acres, 
LLC, holding equal interests, were Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr, Bruce Hughes, Thomas 
Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Tuttle. (R. 279.) 
10. The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc. operated a private school in Cedar 
City, Utah. (R. 279.) 
11. Academy Acres, LLC, owned the real estate holdings upon which the The 
Academy At Cedar Mountain school operated. (R. 279.) 
12. Academy Equity Investors, LLC, was initially organized to receive financial 
contributions to finance the operation of the school as a whole. (R. 279.) 
13. From the inception, Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, and Thomas Fuller were 
directors of The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc. (R. 279.) 
14. On January 4, 2000, the directors of The Academy At Cedar Mountain 
adopted the official Bylaws of The Academy At Cedar Mountain. (R. 279.) 
15. The Bylaws of The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., by reference, at 
Exhibit A, a stockholder buy-sell agreement containing the following provisions (R. 
279): 
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1.3 Transfers At Death. On the death of any stockholder, the stockholder's 
personal representative will be deemed to have offered to sell to the Academy all 
the deceased stockholder's shares in the company at the agreement price and on 
the agreement terms, as indicated in this section. 
1.7 Ownership In Academy Acres, LLC. The shareholders contemplate the 
formation of a real estate limited liability company to be named Academy Acres, 
LLC, for the purpose of owning and operating real estate and real property for the 
use and lease by the Academy. Any transfer deed to have incurred under this 
section shall automatically trigger a buyout of the stockholder's ownership in 
Academy Acres, LLC, and effectively cause the stockholder's expulsion from the 
LLC. 
2.1 Annual Revisions. Each year the stockholders shall meet and shall 
review the agreement price. If the stockholder's unanimously so agree, they shall 
modify the agreement price to reflect that they believe to be the then current fair 
market value of the company. The agreement price shall be determined by taking 
the current agreed fair market value of the company minus all mortgages, debts, 
stockholder loans and accrued payables of the company. It is possible, from time 
to time, that the agreement price will be a negative value, which will represent an 
obligation of the transferring stockholder of their estate to the company. 
2.2 Automatic Adjustment. At the end of each fiscal year beginning after 
the date of this agreement, if the stockholders have not unanimously agreed to an 
adjustment in the agreement price for two consecutive fiscal years, pursuant to 
section 2.1, the agreement price, as most recently adjusted, shall be valued by 
appraisal pursuant to section 2.3. 
2.3 How Computed. The agreement price will be the fair market value of 
the offered shares as determined by the independent certified public accountant 
("CPA") regularly employed by the Academy or, if the Academy has no regularly 
employed independent CPA, an independent CPA selected by the Academy for 
this purpose. This valuation shall be determined under the same methods as would 
be used for determining the estate tax value of the offered shares if the offering 
stockholder had died on the date the offered was deemed made, ignoring any 
alternate valuation date (under Code §2032) or special use valuation (under Code 
§2032A). 
3.2 Negative Value Payment Due To The Academy. If the agreed value 
calculated or agreed to in section 2 above is a negative value, the determining 
stockholder and estate shall have an obligation payable to the company. 
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3.2.1 Due To Death Of Stockholder. The negative values of the shares of 
the deceased stockholders shall, to the extent of the death benefit amount of the 
life insurance policies that any stockholder has maintained under section 4, be paid 
in cash by good or personal check. Any remaining amount of the negative value 
shall be a claim against the available assets of the stockholder's estate. 
16. The initial members of Academy Acres, LLC, entered in the Operating 
Agreement of Academy Acres, LLC, effective August 1, 2000. (R. 280.) 
17. The Operating Agreement of Academy Acres, LLC, contained an Exhibit A, 
containing a Member's Buy-Sell Agreement incorporated into the Operating Agreement 
by reference. (R. 280.) 
18. A Member's Buy-Sell Agreement contained the following provisions (R. 280-
281): 
1.3 Transfers at Death. On the death of any member, the member's 
personal representative will be deemed to have offered to sell to the Academy all 
of the deceased's member's interests in the company at the agreement price and on 
the agreement terms as indicated in this section. 
2.3 How Computed. The agreement price will be the fair market value of 
the offered interest as determined by the independent certified public accountant 
("CPA") regularly employed by the Academy or, if the Academy has no regularly 
employed independent CPA, an independent CPA selected by the Academy for 
this purpose. This valuation shall be determined under the same methods as would 
be used for determining the estate tax value of the offered interests if the offering 
member had died on the date the offered was deemed made, ignoring any alternate 
valuation date (under Code §2032) or special use valuation (under Code §2032A). 
3.2 Negative Value Payment Due To The Academy. If the agreed value 
calculated or agreed to in section 2 above, is negative value, the determining 
member or their estate will have an obligation payable to the company. 
3.2.1 Due To Death Of A Member. The negative values of the interests of 
the deceased member shall, to the extent of the death benefit amount of the life 
insurance policies that any member has maintained under section 4, be paid in 
cash or good personal check. Any remaining amount of the negative value shall 
be a claim against the available assets of the member's estate. 
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19. Thomas Hughes regularly provided and maintained the accounting books and 
records of The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., and Academy Acres, LLC. (R. 281.) 
20. Upon the death of Sheryl Marie Bluth Fair, Thomas Hughes calculated Ms. 
Farr's share of the negative value of The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., and 
Academy Acres, LLC. (R. 281.) 
21. Article VI of the Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr Trust provided as follows (R. 281): 
6.1 Payment of Expenses, Claims, and Taxes. On my death, my Trustee is 
authorized, but not directed, to pay the following: 
6.1.2 Legal Claims. Legally enforceable claims against me or my estate. 
22. As Trustee of the Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr Living Trust, Bruce Hughes paid 
$6,000.00 directly to The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., as a partial payment of 
decedent's negative value in that entity. (R. 281.) 
23. As Trustee of the Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr Living Trust, Bruce Hughes paid 
$115,000.00 to Academy Equity Investors, LLC, as and for partial payment upon the 
negative value of the decedent's interest in The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., and 
Academy Acres, LLC. (R. 282.) 
24. Thomas Hughes is an accountant and regularly performed and maintained the 
accounting books and records of The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., Academy 
Acres, LLC, and Academy Equity Investors, LLC. (R. 254.) 
25. After the death of Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr, Thomas Hughes prepared an 
accounting of the assets and liabilities of The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., and 
Academy Acres, LLC, based upon the books and records of those entities. (R. 254.) 
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26. The accounting provided in Exhibit A was made as a valuation determined 
under the same methods as would be used for determining the estate tax value of the 
offered shares if the offering stockholder had died on the date the offer was deemed 
made, ignoring any alternate valuation date (under Code §2032) or special use valuation 
(under Code §2032A). (R. 254.) 
27. According to Thomas Hughes' accounting, the liabilities of The Academy At 
Cedar Mountain exceeded its assets by the sum of $572,716.70. The Estate of Sheryl 
Marie Bluth Fair's share of said debt, less the $1,000.00 capital contribution already 
made by Sheryl Marie Bluth Fair, was $113,543.34. (R. 254-255.) 
28. According to Thomas Hughes' accounting, the liabilities of Academy Acres, 
LLC, exceeded its assets by the sum of $177,861.62. The Estate of Sheryl Marie Bluth 
Fair's one-fifth share of said excess liability over assets is $35,572.32. (R. 255.) 
29. Based upon Thomas Hughes' accounting, the total negative values of both 
The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., and Academy Acres, LLC, due and owing by the 
Estate of Sheryl Marie Bluth Fair was $149,115.66. (R. 255.) 
30. The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc., was paid $6,000.00 towards said debt. 
(R. 255.) 
31. A check in the amount of $ 115,000.00 was paid to Academy Equity Investors, 
LLC, in partial satisfaction of the negative values owed to The Academy At Cedar 
Mountain, Inc., and Academy Acres, LLC. (R. 255.) 
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32. After application of the two foregoing payments, the Estate of Sheryl Marie 
Bluth Farr still owes, as and for her share of negative value, the sum of $28,115.66. (R. 
255.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case centered around Utah Code Annotated § 75-7-404(2), prior to its July 1, 
2004, revision, which provided as follows: 
Any sale or encumbrance to the trustee, the trustee's spouse, agent, 
attorney, or any corporation or trust in which the trustee has a 
substantial beneficiary interest or any transaction, which is affected 
by a substantial conflict of interest on the part of the trustee, is 
voidable by any interested person, except one who has consented 
after fair disclosure unless: 
(a) the trust expressly authorized the transaction; or 
(b) the transaction is approved by the court after notice to interested 
persons. 
It has always been conceded in this case that Bruce Hughes was the trustee of the 
Sheryl Farr Trust while at the same time was a member or shareholder of certain business 
entities to which the decent Trustor, Sheryl Farr, was his business partner. Before Sheryl 
Fair's death, the parties entered into buy-sell agreements concerning the various business 
entities which included provisions as to the consequences of death of a shareholder or 
member and the obligations of the parties. It was the clear intent of the buy-sell 
agreements that upon death the shareholder's or member's interest was deemed offered 
for sale at an agreed upon price. The "agreed upon price" was an attempt to value the 
business and, if the business had a positive value, the estate would be entitled to a share 
of that positive value. Likewise, if it was determined that the business entities had a 
negative value it was clear that the deceased shareholder's or member's estate had an 
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obligation to pay an equal share of that negative value. Unfortunately, at the time of 
Sheryl Fair's death, the business entities were new, and due to significant debt had 
negative values. 
Subsequent to the death of Sheryl Farr the remaining business partners got 
together and calculated the negative value of the business entities consistent with the 
mandates of the buy-sell agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the buy-sell agreements, the 
members or shareholders were required to come to an agreed upon price, but were not 
required to utilize the services of an independent certified public accountant. An agreed 
upon price was created as calculated by one of the business partners, Tom Fuller, and 
presented to the Court by Affidavit in Support of Summary Judgment. That calculation 
was, and always been, undisputed fact. Plaintiffs never produced any evidence that 
would suggest a contrary calculation. 
The mandates of Utah Code Annotated § 75-7-404(2) are clear that transactions 
affected by conflicts of interest are 'Voidable", and not "void." In other words, the 
Court, when faced with a conflict of interest, has discretion to determine the propriety of 
the transaction and determine whether it should be set aside or not. The court made clear 
in its decision upon Defendants' second Motion for Summary Judgment that, "The buy-
sell agreements remained for litigation." (R. 351.) The Court clarified in its hearing on 
Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment that it was essentially looking for 
clarification as to the proper calculation of the debt. The Court made clear that if 
Defendants' calculation was not refuted, and appeared appropriate, that there was no 
reason to void the transaction. Plaintiffs' failure to provide any evidence of an incorrect 
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calculation resulted in a finding of no genuine issue of material fact as to that calculation. 
The Court determined that if the calculation was correct, and the estate of Sheryl Fan-
owed money to the business entities, that it was proper for her trust to pay that debt of the 
estate. Absent a showing of some impropriety, the conflict of interest alone was not 
sufficient enough to void the transaction. 
It is Defendants' position that, given Plaintiffs failure to come forward with any 
evidence of an improper calculation and failure to produce an expert to even attempt to 
review or dispute the calculation, it was clear that Plaintiffs could not prevail at trial with 
a sufficient burden of proof in showing the Court that it should void this transaction. 
Consequently, the Court's final ruling on summary judgment was proper. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment was Proper. 
Plaintiffs argue, in essence, upon appeal, that the grant of summary judgment in 
Defendants' favor was improper because (a) Plaintiffs had already won the case on 
summary judgment, (b) that they were not required to have the assistance of an expert 
witness, and (c) that they were inappropriately sanctioned. Each of the Plaintiffs' 
arguments on appeal is misplaced because Plaintiffs fail to recognize the difference 
between a transaction that is "void" and a transaction that is "voidable." The relied upon 
statute, Utah Code Annotated § 75-7-404(2) clearly provided that a transaction was 
"voidable" not "void" if affected by a substantial conflict of interest. Plaintiffs' entire 
appeal is premised on the fact that a Court made a finding of a conflict of interest and, 
Plaintiff would argue, that Plaintiff won the case based upon that finding aloae. Plaintiffs 
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fail to recognize that if there were a determination that the debt was proper, and properly 
calculated, that the Court had discretion to not void the transaction despite the conflict the 
interest. 
A. The Plaintiffs' Prior Grant of Summary Judgment was 
Partial Only to the Issue of Conflict of Interest. 
The Plaintiffs assert, in their appeal, that because the Court ordered on December 
12, 2006, that there was a breach of the buy-sell agreement and that the trustee had 
breached its fiduciary duties, and that the trustee was ordered to disgorge funds back to 
the trust, that that was the "law of the case" and the case was essentially over. It is quite 
curious that the Defendants would voluntarily enter into a Stipulation to extend deadlines 
concerning expert reports, if they truly believed the case was over. More importantly, 
Plaintiffs' assertions completely ignore the Court's December 12, 2006, ruling wherein it 
states, as a Conclusion of Law number three that, "It remains for the parties to either 
litigate their obligations under the buy-sell agreements, or to settle or to mediate." (R. 
351.) That language was clarified in the hearing upon Defendants' Motion to Alter or 
Amend the Judgment wherein Defendants' counsel inquired the following: 
Where I'm a little curious in the Court's Order it says the buy-sell 
agreements must be followed and remain for litigation, and I'm a 
little unclear as to what the Court was intending there. Are we not, 
then, going back and saying, okay, we need to find out whether the 
calculation was the right calculation? 
The Court: That's the way I saw it, counsel. 
Mr. Olson: Okay. And so I guess under that theory, if we continued 
in the litigation under the Court's Order as set, we come into the 
Court, we put on evidence of whether that figure was the right 
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figure. If it was the right figure, there is no money to be paid back. 
And if it was the wrong figure, then there is money to be paid back. 
The Court: And the issue is what to do with the money in the 
meantime, and the Court's Order says to pay it back into the trust 
and to hold it in the trust until that litigation is done, we figure out 
what that price is. 
Mr. Olson: Right. 
The Court: That's the way I see this litigation coming out. I don't 
see this case as having been dissolved — or resolved by my summary 
judgment. 
Mr. Olson: And, of course — 
The Court: In fact, I have to say since she's here in the courtroom, 
my clerk and I both came to that conclusion at the time we were 
going over this Order specifically, we decided that the next step is to 
find out what is the price. 
(R. 641-642. See Addendum) 
It is impossible for Plaintiffs to come forward now and state that because the Court 
found that there was a conflict of interest or that the buy-sell agreement was not followed 
that the case was over as the Court clearly indicates that a price must be determined and 
Plaintiffs may be entitled to nothing. 
Plaintiffs go on to assert that because of the Court's orders and the law of the case, 
that "expert testimony" was unnecessary and the failure to provide expert reports had no 
effect upon the Court or the claims of Defendants. The fundamental flaw of the 
Plaintiffs' argument is that the Court made it abundantly clear that the only issue 
remaining for trial was the calculation of that debt. The only calculation of Ihe debt 
before the Court was that as asserted by the Defendants, and undisputed by Plaintiffs. 
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The Court attempted to provide Plaintiffs with opportunity to dispute that debt by having 
an expert review it. Again, that was abundantly clear in the Court's hearing upon 
Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend wherein the Court stated, "It may be moot if 
you're right and an expert suggested by the Plaintiffs comes in and looks at what your 
clients [Defendants] did and said, yeah, that's the way you value it and they were right, 
then we're done." (R. 643.) The Court further ordered that, "The discovery deadlines 
have to be extended so you can get out and get some expert testimony on this." (R. 644.) 
The Court suggested, as an option, that the Defendant "may want to get your own 
independent expert who's going to say exactly what your people said." (R. 644.) The 
Court recognized that "Mr. Kuhlmann might find that he can't find one [expert] in which 
case this case is over with." (R. 644.) 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs cannot possibly argue that no expert was 
necessary as they had no other means to dispute the calculation provided by Defendants 
at trial. 
B. Plaintiffs' Need for an Expert Report was not "Rebuttal" in 
Nature but Rather, Necessary to Carry its Burden of Proof 
at Trial. 
Plaintiffs next assert that the only reason they would have used an expert would be 
to rebut any expert provided by Defendants. Plaintiffs, curiously, go on to argue that they 
had already received a favorable ruling requiring restitution of the funds, and they had, 
essentially, already won the case. This assertion is curious given the Trial Court's 
repeated explanation that the sole remaining issue at trial was calculation of this debt, that 
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the only calculation before the Court was that of Defendants and that Plaintiff would be 
required to provide, presumably through experts, some evidence of the inaccuracy of this 
calculation. The Trial Court made it very clear to Plaintiffs that if they could not find an 
expert or if their expert came forward and agreed with the calculation then the Court 
would determine that the amounts were properly paid and the money should be returned. 
It is also curious that Plaintiffs would argue their expert report was required only 
for rebuttal purposes when the Stipulation, and the Order actually entered, required that 
they first provide an expert report no later than June 15, 2007. Defendants were not 
required to provide an expert report until after the Plaintiffs on July 13, 2007. The Order 
provided absolutely no provision allowing for any additional expert report by the 
Plaintiffs to rebut that of the Defendants. This is a Stipulated Scheduling Order that 
Plaintiffs' counsel drafted. Given the specific requirement of the Plaintiffs to first 
designate and first provide an expert report, and the fact that Plaintiffs' counsel drafted 
this document, Plaintiffs cannot possibly argue that they had no obligation to produce 
until after the Defendants had done so. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is simply impossible for the Plaintiffs to argue that 
they needed to provide expert testimony only in the nature of rebuttal. Rather, given the 
only issue remaining for trial was whether Defendants had accurately calculated the debt, 
Plaintiffs should be required to answer the question; "What evidence did Plaintiffs have 
that the calculations were incorrect?" The obvious answer to that question, absent an 
expert review and report, is "nothing." Furthermore, Plaintiffs appellate argument that 
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they were substantially justified in failing to comply with the Scheduling Order, based 
upon this "rebuttal" theory is also misplaced. 
C. The Trial Court's Sanctions were Proper. 
Plaintiff asserts that the Trial Court sanctioned them for failing to comply with 
Rule 16(d) and 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to comply with the 
Scheduling Order. It is important to note, in the Court's memorandum decision, that it 
recognized the Plaintiffs had "failed even now to produce evidence that the calculations 
are in fact incorrect..." Although the Court does analyze the effects of Rule 16 and 37, 
on the failure to follow scheduling orders, it is clear that the Court recognizes that there 
exists no genuine issue of material fact as to the calculation of the debt, the only 
remaining issue for trial. Consequently, regardless of any sanction, summary judgment 
was proper to the Defendants as a matter of law. 
The trial court has broad discretion to select the appropriate sanction to apply 
under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Hales v. Oldrovd. 999 P.2d 588 (Utah 
App. 2000). Plaintiffs suggest that the Hall v. NACM Intermountain Inc., 988 P.2d 942 
(Utah 1999) imposes upon the Court some requirement with regard to sanctions under 
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs' assertion is incorrect. The Hall 
decision dealt with sanctions imposed against an attorney for failure to notify fellow 
counsel of a scheduling continuance. The Hall decision deals specifically with sanctions 
pursuant to Rule 16. In fact, the Hall decision does not even cite Rule 37 and has no 
bearing with regard to a court's ruling under Rule 37. Consequently, Plaintiffs' argument 
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that some more detailed memorandum, other than the Court's Order as entered, is 
required to impose sanctions under Rule 37 is simply misplaced. 
D. Plaintiffs are Not Relieved of Their Obligation to Provide an 
Expert Report Merely Because Defendants Failed To. 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant did not provide a timely expert report pursuant to 
the Court's Scheduling Order. That is true. However, what Plaintiffs fail to recognize 
that Defendants have already put forth undisputed facts with regard to the calculation of 
the debt in question. Defendant had absolutely no obligation to present this evidence 
through an expert. Rather, the Court merely suggested, that if Plaintiffs were going to 
hire an expert that Defendants may desire to do so. The fallacy of Plaintiffs' argument is 
that Plaintiffs, who have the burden of proof, had absolutely no evidence, expert or 
otherwise, to suggest that the calculation was inaccurate. When Plaintiffs failed to take 
the opportunity provided to them, by the Court, to hire an expert to review the 
calculation, then Plaintiffs simply had no way to rebut the calculation as provided by the 
Defendants and could not succeed on that issue at trial. Although Plaintiffs couch this 
argument by suggesting Plaintiffs were punished and Defendants were not, the reality is 
that Plaintiffs cannot prove their case at trial and Defendants had no need f DY an expert. 
Therefore, the suggestion that only one party was sanctioned in this case is simply 
misplaced. 
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II. CONCLUSION 
On February 20, 2007, the Trial Court made it abundantly clear that the only issue 
left for trial was to determine the appropriate calculation of the debt owed by the estate of 
Sheryl Fair to the various business entities to find out if the payment to those entities is 
appropriate. The Trial Court understood that Defendants had already presented a 
calculation as to their position on the debt. The Trial Court made it abundantly clear to 
Plaintiffs that they would need to provide some evidence that the calculation was 
incorrect to avoid payment of that debt. Plaintiffs simply failed to procure the 
appropriate expert, or any expert report, or even have any expert conduct a review, to 
meet that burden of proof. Plaintiffs seem to assert that a conflict of interest, regardless 
of the validity of the debt, entitles to them to a windfall and avoidance of their mother's 
contracted debts. The very nature of a "voidable" transaction requires a court's discretion 
to determine propriety given the conflict of interest. The Trial Court's grant of summary 
judgment is entirely appropriate and should not be overruled. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 2008. 
j^s? ZS£ 
Brian L. Olson 
of and for 
GALLIAN, WILCOX, 
WELKER, OLSON & BECKSTROM, L.C. 
Attorney for Defendants 
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**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC. ** 
(435) 688-7844 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE BAILIFF: All rise. The Court will 
4 continue in session. Please be seated. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you, everyone, we're 
6 back on the record for the 20th of February and it is 
7 Farr versus Hughes, 030500098. 
8 Mr. Olson, you are here on behalf of the 
9 defendants. Even though all your pleadings on this 
10 thing say you1re attorneys for plaintiff, I know 
11 you're attorneys for defendant. You want the Court 
12 to revisit the findings of fact in the Court's 
13 memorandum decision in this case because as I see it 
14 it's your position that the buy-sell agreements 
15 provided that there would be a two year continuous 
16 period of failure of the parties to agree on a value 
17 before there would be a submission to an independent 
18 CPA for valuation, and that the agreements were 
19 executed in August of 2001 and Mrs. Farr died in 
20 October of 2001. And, therefore, a two year period 
21 of time could not have passed, just as a matter of 
22 fact, this agreement had only been in place for 60 
23 plus days at the time of her death. 
24 Have I got that right, Counsel? 
25 MR. OLSON: Pretty close, Counsel. 
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1 Actually the agreements, if I remember correctly, 
2 were signed in the fall of 2000. So there was about 
3 a year from the time they were signed until the time 
4 of Sheryl Farr's death, but still less than the 
5 two-year period. I think I've got that right. 
6 But essentially the Court's ruling was 
7 that, hey, we can't call this a legally enforceable 
8 claim against the estate because the buy-sell 
9 agreements were not complied with. In fact, Looking 
10 at the Court's order on page 7 it says, The buy-sell 
11 agreements do not give rise to an enforceable claim 
12 against the deceased member or shareholder's estate 
13 until certain conditions are fulfilled, one of those 
14 conditions being that it be valued by an independent 
15 certified public accountant. 
16 THE COURT: But the prequel to that 
17 condition was that there would be two years go by 
18 without any agreement as to valuation of the asset. 
19 MR. OLSON: That's exactly right, Your 
20 Honor. So I think that that portion of the 
21 agreements were overlooked. And the Court correctly 
22 notes in its findings of fact that the agreements for 
23 the two different entities are virtually identical 
24 with regard to how we calculate the agreement price. 
25 The agreement price isn't calculated just 
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1 pursuant to that paragraph 2.3 that's quoted. 
2 Rather, the entire Section 2 goes to how do we 
3 calculate the agreement price, and it talks about the 
4 annual revisions and it talks about the parties to 
5 the agreement, or the members of these entities, 
6 coming to an agreement as to value, only if they do 
7 not do that for two consecutive fiscal years do we 
8 get to the point of needing an independent certified 
9 public accountant. 
10 THE COURT: But as I understand the facts 
11 in this case, no action was taken to reach any 
12 valuation whatsoever for two successive years at the 
13 time that the payments were made from the trust into 
14 the entities. 
15 MR. OLSON: But actually that's not 
16 correct. At the time of the death of Sheryl Farr, 
17 Thomas Hughes and Thomas Fuller sat down and made 
18 such an accounting, the accounting that was put 
19 before the Court in the affidavit -- I believe it's 
20 on Ms. Hughes, I get the two confused, or Thomas 
21 Fuller. There was an accounting made and all the 
22 members got together and said, Yeah, that's the value 
23 of the entity. 
24 THE COURT: Except, Counsel, how do we get 
25 around this self dealing that seems to be implicit of 
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1 your interpretation of the documents? Everybody who 
2 is a beneficiary of this particular process is an 
3 insider and the Farr trust is locked out in that 
4 process, and that's why Mr. Kuhlmann's clients are in 
5 court. 
6 MR. OLSON: Sure. And I understand the 
7 Court's concern. 
8 The other problem that we have on the 
9 other end of this equation is how do we put parties 
10 to an agreement that they didn't make? We ha^e to 
11 look at the buy-sell agreement and we have to abide 
12 by what the parties agreed to do. 
13 Now, by that same token, I think the way 
14 that we solve this problem, obviously in the 
15 litigation is, plaintiffs hire their expert, he goes 
16 in and looks at the accounting and says You've done 
17 correctly or no, it wasn't done correctly. But they 
18 never do that. Now, this case is four years old, 
19 discovery deadlines have long since passed, they've 
20 never gone in and audited the books to see if this 
21 calculation was correct or it wasn't correct. 
22 Rather, when we filed for summary judgment and we 
23 stated that the undisputed facts are here's the 
24 accounting, they didn't deny it. So it was an 
25 established fact for purposes of summary judgment 
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1 that this was the calculation of the debt. 
2 THE COURT: When it comes to established 
3 facts for summary judgment, what about Mr. Kuhlmann's 
4 argument that there was no compliance with Rule 11 
5 and we have a recent Utah Court of Appeals case that 
6 really does enforce rules -- ITm sorry, Rule 7, not 
7 Rule 11. Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
8 in the memorandum going back and forth, Mr. Kuhlmann 
9 makes the argument that there is and there is now 
10 supported case law to say that thatTs got to be done. 
11 MR. OLSON: I guess I'm not entirely sure 
12 what we're talking about here. 
13 THE COURT: Well, IT11 let Mr. Kuhlmann 
14 fill us in. I understand your argument, Counsel, 
15 it's just that Irm not very comfortable with it in 
16 view of the insider nature of your accounting. I'm 
17 not sure that the agreements say that as I read it. 
18 Mr. .Kuhlmann, you want to leave it where 
19 it is and you think that Rule 7 has not been complied 
20 with, and I'm on solid ground in ruling where I did 
21 in that fashion? Am I right, Counsel? 
22 MR. KUHLMANN: Your Honor, I'm at a loss 
23 as well on Rule 7. 
24 THE COURT: You --
25 MR. KUHLMANN: I don't recall --
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THE COURT: You came in with your 
memorandum in opposition. Under Rule URCP 7, each 
fact -- the defendants failed to dispute such factual 
statements in their responsive memoranda. Under 
URCP 7, each fact — in the middle of y.our second 
page. -Each fact set forth in the moving party's 
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless controverted by the 
responding party. That's what you are arguing. 
MR. KUHLMANN: Yes, Your Honor. And I am 
comfortable with standing on that. But let me — can 
I address a couple of the facts, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Go right ahead, Counsel. 
MR. KUHLMANN: We didn't do an audit, 
you're right. We didn't need to. I think, why go 
through the expense and incur all of that debt for my 
clients after we've already lost money when we didn't 
need to? 
It's very -- it's a very creative argument 
that's being made by Mr. Olson, but it's just plain 
wrong for several reasons. And a fact that has not 
been distinguished here and may be more clear in the 
Court's findings is that there is one buy-sell 
agreement that makes any difference in this case. 
Only one. Not --
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1 THE COURT: Because the other entity is 
2 not existent. 
3 MR. KUHLMANN: The other entity didn't get 
4 payment. There was no payment made to Academy Acres. 
5 So we don't care. They didn't buy out the shares. 
6 They didn't cut a check to Academy Acres. Academy 
7 Acres apparently didn't exercise its right to buy out 
8 the interest. 
9 The check was cut to Academy at Cedar 
10 Mountain where there was a buy-sell agreement. So 
11 we're talking about $6,000. The other check was cut 
12 to Academy Equity Investors, who does not have a 
13 buy-sell agreement. Never did. There was no 
14 obligation for Sheryl Fuller's estate to pay anything 
15 to them because there was no buy-sell agreement. Why 
16 wasn't there? Because the entities controlled by 
17 Mr. Hughes didn't create those documents for 
18 everybody to sign. 
19 The $115,000 simply was not due. That was 
20 paid to Academy Equity Investors. Now, what they 
21 have said is, but these are three entities but 
22 they're really all the same. Huh-uh, either play the 
23 game or you don't. If you're going to take advantage 
24 of the corporate and limited liability laws of the 
25 State of Utah, you are bound by them. They are 
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separate, independent agencies. TheyTre entities 
that cannot simply say, Oh, we're going to pay 
Academy Equity Investors but itTs really money owed 
to Academy Acres pr Academy at Cedar Mountain. So 
there was no basis to pay anyway and we donft care 
what the buy-sell agreement said for Academy Acres. 
THE COURT: The whole agreement upon which 
to make a claim? 
MR. KUHLMANN: Not in Academy Equiby 
Investors, none, no buy-sell agreement. 
The other thing I would like to point out, 
Your Honor, is that there is a fairly creative 
reading of this document that was created by the 
entities. Not by Ms. Farr, but by the entities. But 
if you'll look at the provision on transfers of debt, 
it says the Academy -- this is the Academy at Cedar 
Mountain, this is the one thatTs in existence. It 
says they'll be deemed to have offered to sell to the 
Academy all of its C shareholders shares in the 
company at the agreed price, which is shown as 
defining terms, capital letters, on the agreed terms. 
Okay, again capital letters showing it as defined. 
Now, if you'll look at the provision on 
which they're relying for a two year mandatory 
waiting period, it's simply not there. There are 
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1 three different provisions. One says annual 
2 revisions and it says how youTre going to do it 
3 annually. It says, Each of the stockholders shall 
4 agree -- shall review the -- again, defined term, 
5 agreement price. If they unanimously ag-ree, then 
6 they modify that price, okay? And it says this is 
7 what you're going to look at. So that's the annual 
8 revision. So they sit down and try and determine the 
9 agreement price. 
10 The second one, 2.2, says automatic 
11 adjustment, and it ties to each fiscal year beginning 
12 after the date of the agreement as far as itfs 
13 starting point. So beginning at the fiscal year 
14 after the date of the agreement, which according to 
15 the information I think was in the affidavit of Bruce 
16 Hughes, said it was January 4th, I believe, of 2000 
17 when Academy at Cedar Mountain signed their buy-sell 
18 agreement. 
19 So beginning on the fiscal year after 
20 that, then if they have not unanimously agreed under 
21 Section 1 of the annual revision, if they haven't 
22 agreed for two consecutive years, then you appraise 
23 the value as shown in Section 2.3, okay? 
24 THE COURT: With the independent CPA? 
25 MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly. But 2.3 is not 
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1 part of the two-year provision. That's 2.2. In the 
2 event -- how do you calculate the defined, quote, 
3 agreement price? 2.3 tells you how regardless of 
4 whether you're doing it annually or whether you're 
5 doing it automatically. The only time that it's done 
6 automatically is if the members can't agree, and it's 
7 just telling you, you just do it the same way that 
8 the members are doing it. And how are they supposed 
9 to do it? By an independent certified accountant. 
10 THE COURT: So you rely on the Court's 
11 reading, even if this was the agreement, but it's 
12 only talking about $10,000 -- or $6,000 of over 
13 $130,000? 
14 MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly, Your Honor. I 
15 mean -- and the Court's ruling is not just based on 
16 this agreement. In here it finds there was no 
17 accounting by the trustee, the trustee didn't act for 
18 the benefit of the beneficiaries, finds that there 
19 was conflict of interest, all of which, regardless of 
20 this agreement, justified voiding the transactions 
21 and bringing the money back into the estate and 
22 charging the trustee with attorney's fees for it. 
23 So I don't think there's a problem lere. 
24 THE COURT: Counsel, does the court's 
25 findings miss the difference between the entities and 
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1 the fact that the check went to an -entity that did 
2 not have a buy-sell? 
3 MR. KUHLMANN: I think it is a little 
4 unclear because it talks about both the agreements 
5 with Academy at Cedar Mountain and Academy Acres. 
6 There is a comment that Academy Equity Investors was 
7 in place and went out of existence in 2005, and it 
8 does say that it went there. But as I read through 
9 this, it tended to — I don!t think Academy Acres has 
10 any basis for anything. They didn't get payment. 
11 I mean, it's kind of been a mix of trying 
12 to say, Well, they were all the same entities, and 
13 that's kind of what the defendants1 position has been 
14 throughout the case. But I don't think they have a 
15 claim whatsoever, and it --
16 THE COURT: Should I modify the findings 
17 and the final order to reflect the distinct point 
18 that you brought up at argument, Counsel? 
19 MR. KUHLMANN: I think it may -- may help, 
20 Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: All right. 
22 MR. KUHLMANN: My guess this case may go 
23 up on appeal, and I think it may help to make that 
24 distinction. 
25 THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . T h a t ' s y o u r 
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1 position. 
2 And, Mr. Olson, you take the position that 
3 your reading is the accurate one and that this 
4 tripwire simply was never tripped? 
5 MR. OLSON: Well, exactly, Your Honor. 
6 And I would like to address this other entity issue 
7 as well. In fact, I think we argued it probably ad 
8 nauseam when we came in for summary judgment. 
9 We never disputed the fact that the 
10 payment went to Academy Equity Investors, LLC, and 
11 that that entity wasn't owed under the buy-sell 
12 agreements. But the undisputed fact from our motion 
13 for summary judgment was that it went to pay off the 
14 debt at Academy Acres, LLC. 
15 THE COURT: So it was paid in behalf of 
16 Acres, LLC? 
17 MR. OLSON: I mean, the best corollary if 
18 Mr. Kuhlmann owes me $10 and I owe you $10, and I say 
19 Mr. Kuhlmann pay it to Judge Shumate, what's the 
20 problem with doing that? 
21 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
22 MR. OLSON: They haven1t suggested that 
23 that this isnft exactly what happened. In fact, my 
24 clients conceded, Yeah, the money that went to 
25 Academy Equity Investors, LLC, went to the debt of 
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1 Academy Acres, LLC, no big deal. 
2 So it!s really of no consequence what 
3 entity it went to, as long as the debt's satisfied. 
4 THE COURT: And as far as you look at it, 
5 the real issue is whether or not that tripwire has 
6 been met? 
7 MR. OLSON: Yeah. So, you know, really 
8 getting back to the tripwire issue, Mr. Kuhlmann has 
9 taken us to the on account of death of a shareholder 
10 or member that it's going to be paid according to the 
11 agreement price, and then he takes you directly to 
12 2.3, saying, Hey, it says agreement price is 
13 calculated this way. 
14 But if we look at Section 2, the very 
15 title of that entire section is agreement price. 
16 It's not just 2.3 how we calculate it, it's not just 
17 the two year independent CPA rule; rather, it's the 
18 annual revisions, the automatic adjustment, and then 
19 if two years go by, two fiscal years go by, without 
20 an agreement as to price, we get to the CPA. We 
21 never got there. 
22 THE COURT: How can there be an agreement 
23 as to price when Mrs. Farr is deceased after the 
24 first year and her legal representatives through her 
25 trust are no longer there? 
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1 MR. OLSON: You know, and I agree that's 
2 an interesting question. At the time of her death 
3 her shares are deemed offered for sale to the entity 
4 at this price. 
5 And you1re right under the agreement, how 
6 do we determine what that price is? Well, the 
7 members agree. We have four remaining members in 
8 that entity, and the members agreed on what the price 
9 was. 
10 THE COURT: Counsel, since your entities 
11 drafted the agreement and there appears to be at 
12 least some ambiguity as to how one looks at that 
13 agreement under the facts of this case, Mrs. Farr 
14 having died within the first two-year block, doesn't 
15 the agreement get construed against you? 
16 MR. OLSON: Well, the problem, Your Honor, 
17 is that Sheryl Farr, and really Mr. Kuhlmann's 
18 clients are an extension of Sheryl Farr, was in on 
19 the drafting. 
20 THE COURT: Uh~huh. 
21 MR. OLSON: I mean, everybody on this case 
22 was a draftsman. The heirs of Sheryl Farr may not 
23 have been, but they're not parties to that agreement 
24 either. Sheryl Farr was a party to the agreement, as 
25 were Mr. Hughes, Mr. Fuller, the other Mr. Hughes, 
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1 and Ms. Tuttle. They were all the draftsmen of these 
2 agreements, they all entered into them, they all 
3 signed them. 
4 So there is not any party to construe it 
5 against as, you know, Ms. Farr was a part of this as 
6 well. 
7 THE COURT: I see your point. 
8 MR. OLSON: Now, the only other issue 
9 that — I mean, essentially we filed summary judgment 
10 under one of the two prongs of the conflict of 
11 interest statute. The conflict of interest statute 
12 says — there1s basically a couple of exceptions 
13 where the self dealing may occur. That's when the 
14 trust authorizes the transaction. And that's the 
15 argument we were making, the trust authorized payment 
16 of legally enforceable claims. The other one was if 
17 the parties consented. That issue hasn't been 
18 addressed. We certainly assert that they did, and 
19 that issue remains to be litigated. 
20 So I think the Court needs to understand 
21 that before we start issuing summary judgment on the 
22 entire case. That issue hasn't been addressed. We 
23 believe that there is certainly evidence that will 
24 suggest at the very least Chad Farr consented to 
25 this, knew full well what was going on. 
**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC.** 
(435) 688-7844 
18 
The other issues that I think the Court 
needs to address if the Court is going to deny my 
motion today, and I can't think of any reason why 
they would. But if the Court is going to deny my 
motion today, where I'm a little curious in the 
Court's order it says the buy-sell agreements must be 
followed and remain from litigation, and I'm a little 
unclear as to what the Court was intending there. 
Are we not, then, going back and saying, okay, we 
need to find out whether the calculation was the 
right calculation? 
THE COURT: That's the way I saw it, 
Counsel. 
MR. OLSON: Okay. And so I guess under 
that theory, if we continued in litigation under the 
Court's order as set, we come into the court, we put 
on the evidence of whether that figure was the right 
figure. If it .was the right figure, there is no 
money to be paid back. If it was the wrong figure, 
then there's money to be paid back. 
THE COURT: And the issue is what do we do 
with the money in the meantime? And the Court's 
order says to pay it back into the trust and to hold 
it until the trust until that litigation is done, we 
figure out what the price is. 
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MR. OLSON: Right. 
THE COURT: ThatTs the way I see the 
litigation coming out. I don't see this case having 
been dissolved -- or resolved by my summary judgment. 
MR. OLSON: And, of course --
THE COURT: In fact, I have to say since 
she's here in the courtroom, my clerk and I both came 
to that conclusion at the time we were going over 
this order specifically, we decided that the next 
step is to find out what is the price. 
MR. OLSON: Okay. And then the only issue 
with regard to disgorgement, obviously, is, I mean, 
this payment was made back in !03. 
THE COURT: That's not an issue for the 
Court, Counsel. 
MR. OLSON: And I understand, and where 
does the money come from, is the question? Academy 
Equity Investors doesn't have it, it was paid to 
creditors. I mean, we can't go back to creditors and 
find it. 
THE COURT: Academy Equity Investors 
better find a line of credit. 
MR. OLSON: Well, and I understand where 
Your Honor is coming from. 
I guess the last point I would ask, Your 
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1 Honor, if the order is going to stand despite the 
2 motion being filed, would the Court entertain 
3 certifying it as a final order? 
4 THE COURT: I can't, Counsel, not when my 
5 order itself says that we have to litigate the issue 
6 of whether or not the buy-sell agreements have been 
7 appropriately met. It may be moot if you1re right 
8 and an expert suggested by the plaintiffs comes in 
9 and looks at what your clients did and said, yeah, 
10 thatfs the way you value it and they were right, then 
11 we f re done. 
12 MR. OLSON: Okay. Fair enough, Your 
13 Honor. 
14 THE COURT: It's, again, the place that my 
15 clerk and I got to was exactly where you're talking 
16 about, Counsel --
17 MR. OLSON: Okay. 
18 THE COURT: — as we looked at it. 
19 MR. OLSON: Thank you. 
20 THE COURT: Thanks, everyone. The motion 
21 is overruled and denied. 
22 And, Counsel, in view of the fact that the 
23 court summary judgment has rather now narrowed our 
24 scope of our litigation, I think we probably ought to 
25 get a scheduling order for that evaluation and 
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litigation. Can the two of you sit down give me a 
scheduling order within the next 20 days? 
MR. OLSON: I would take it that the 
discovery deadlines are being extended? 
THE COURT: The discovery deadlines have 
to be extended so you can get out and get some expert 
testimony on this. 
MR. OLSON: Yeah, we can extend our order. 
THE COURT: You may want to get your own 
independent expert who's going to say exactly what 
your people said. 
MR. OLSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: Mr. Kuhlmann might find that 
he can't find one, in which case this case is over 
with. 
MR. OLSON 
THE COURT 
MR. OLSON 
Okay. 
Thanks, everyone. 
Thank you, Your Honor, 
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